In CC (by his case companion MC) v Leeds City Council [2018] EWHC 1312 (QB), the Queen’s Bench Division gave direction on the results of neglecting to execute control estimates recognized in a danger appraisal.

In this article James Manning sums up the discoveries from the start occurrence and on Appeal, and gives a valuable update on the level of care that should be practiced by nearby specialists when getting ready danger evaluations and executing control measures.

Synopsis of Facts

The Claimant (“CC”), a kid matured 10, was important for little gathering of loved ones who went to Kirkstall Abbey, a memorable religious community possessed by Leeds to manchester airport taxi City Council (“LCC”).

At Kirkstall Abbey, LCC gave various rides and entertainments pointed explicitly at youngsters. One of the diversions was Hangar 51, where kids were furnished with laser firearms and sent into fight inside an inflatable shelter that was partitioned into nine cases. The laser fight occurred in relative obscurity and it would take a brief time for the kids’ eyes to adjust to the conditions. The cases inside Hangar 51 were at various levels and were isolated by edges, portrayed as “stumbling focuses”.

CC entered Hangar 51 and, inside roughly 30 seconds, stumbled more than one of the edges and fell. The laser weapon struck his front teeth and caused wounds.

First Instance

HHJ Saffman confirmed that CC’s mishap was brought about by LCC’s carelessness in that:

• LCC had neglected to caution CC of the stumbling focuses inside Hangar 51; and

• LCC had neglected to guarantee that the stumbling focuses were more obvious by applying fluorescent strips or nosing to the edge of the edges.


On offer, LCC presented that HHJ Saffman wasn’t right for the accompanying reasons:

• He forced an elevated expectation of care upon LCC that neglected to contemplate the “public obligation measurement to the case”; the low volume of comparable mishaps at Hangar 51; the absence of Hangar 51 members enduring genuine injury; and the way that the edges were not flawed;

• He neglected to apply area 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 while evaluating the norm of care expected of LCC;

• He blundered on the break of obligation when he mulled over proof that was not in reality offered regarding the practicability of introducing precaution measures and neglected to consider the counsel and direction of the producer of Hangar 51; and

• He neglected to distinguish any argued penetrate of obligation that caused CC’s mishap.

Penetrate of Duty

LCC’s danger evaluation in regard to the utilization of Hangar 51 was readied four months before the date of CC’s mishap. Stumbling mishaps were recognized as a predictable danger and the proposed control measure was “members to be cautioned about edge among units and about the possibility to stumble over them”.

LCC’s bosses were provided with a notice content and gave a verbal admonition to members, before the movement began, not to run inside Hangar 51. Anyway, the admonition content didn’t specify the edges and the possibility to stumble over them.

Moreover, LLC’s mishap history for the mid-year 2014 season uncovered that three comparable stumbling mishaps had happened the week prior to CC’s mishap, and one comparable stumbling mishap happened the next week. LCC, perceiving that the heaviness of the proof was overpowering, didn’t seek after these grounds of the allure.


LCC’s entries on causation zeroed in on two particular focuses. These were:

• HHJ Saffman didn’t make a finding that the inability to caution about the edges and stumbling focuses caused CC’s mishap; and

• HHJ Saffman ought to have held that it had not been set up that notice would have kept CC’s mishap from occurring, as the Claimant acknowledged that he had seen the stumbling danger before he fell over it.

Undoubtedly, HHJ Saffman had expressed that LCC’s inability to caution was an independent reason for the mishap. With regards to the subsequent appendage, a qualification was made between CC’s erroneous appraisal of the distinction in stature between the units (he couldn’t pass judgment on the level of danger as a result of the lighting conditions), and LCC’s real information on the risk. The allure court found that responsible an admonition that was predictable with the control measure recognized by LCC would have cautioned CC that the distinction in tallness would speak to a stumbling peril in the event that he was not cautious.

LCC’s concession that it had neglected to give notice to CC and the discoveries on causation implied that there was no compelling reason to consider HHJ Saffman’s methodology comparable to the exclusion of fluorescent strips to the edges or other deterrent measures.

The allure was excused on all grounds.


This case fills in as a valuable token of guaranteeing that where a sensibly predictable danger is distinguished, sensible control measures are conceived and executed completely.

For this situation, LCC accurately distinguished the danger of stumbling and intended to caution members verbally about the risk. Lethally, in any case, this admonition was not given to members since it was not consolidated into the notice content.

From a danger, the board viewpoint, a predictable methodology in recognizing, contriving, and executing sensible control measures is critical, especially in exercises focused on kids.